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PRESENTING A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE




“Law and Economics” courses are sometimes criticized for inadequately
explaining the normative criterion of “economic efficiency” and then ap-
plying this criterion throughout the course in a superficial and biased man-
ner that pejoratively labels most governmental market interventions and
wealth redistribution measures as inefficient.1 These criticisms have merit,
and in this article I point out a number of conceptual problems, empirical
difficulties, and normative shortcomings of the economic efficiency crite-
rion that students need to understand in order to be able to effectively
counter policy arguments that rest upon dubious efficiency assessments.
The eight specific shortcomings of the economic efficiency criterion that
I address in this article are the pervasiveness of severe data limitations that
render efficiency assessments unreliable; the indeterminacy regarding
whether willingness to pay should be measured by offer prices or instead
by asking prices; the difficulty of obtaining honest and accurate responses
as to willingness to pay; the uncertainty as to the appropriate discount rate
that should be used for discounting future policy consequences; the prob-
lem posed for efficiency analyses by endogenous preferences; the severe
difficulties posed by the often-overlooked “problem of person-altering con-
sequences;” the problematic nature of using willingness to pay as a mea-
sure of social value; and finally, the dubious nature of a normative
criterion that does not give special primacy to rights.
* Homer R. Mitchell Endowed Professor in Commercial and Insurance Law, South-
ern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; J.D., 1985, Yale Law School; Ph.D.,
University of Iowa, 1978.
1. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Defini-
tion and Use of the Concept of “The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Effi-
ciency”: Why the Kaldor–Hicks Test, the Coarse Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-
Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 485 (1993); see also
Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 297, 299 (2017).
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I. INTRODUCTION
JOE McKnight was a pillar of the SMU law faculty from 1955 until2015, an incredible sixty-year career that spans most of the history ofthe law school. Joe was widely known to several generations of Texas
lawyers as the leading expert on the influence of Spanish law upon the
Texas legal system, as the leading authority on Texas family law and mat-
rimonial property law, and as a principal drafter of the Texas Family
Code.2 But Joe was not only a leading scholar and active participant in
law reform; he was also an excellent teacher. As any of his students will
tell you, Joe taught his classes in a rigorous and demanding manner, but
his strict approach was always leavened with a wry sense of humor and
recognition of the long history of human folly. He required his students to
deeply question the conventional wisdom in the subjects that he covered.
He insisted that they make efforts not only to learn the law and learn it
well, but also to strive to better understand the interest group dynamics
and social policy considerations that have shaped legislation and judicial
rulings as well as influenced the general climate of intellectual opinion.
This article follows in Joe’s tradition of encouraging skeptical inquiry.
Most Law and Economics3 courses are based upon relatively uncritical
2. Bill Hicks, Joseph W. McKnight: Man of Scholarship and Service, STATE BAR OF
TEXAS: TEXAS BAR BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), http://blog.texasbar.com/2015/04/articles/people/
joseph-w-mcknight-man-of-scholarship-and-service [https://perma.cc/CQC6-N5MG].
3. I will refer generically to those widely-offered upper-level elective law school
courses that apply basic microeconomic concepts to analyze the operation of various as-
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application of the normative criterion of “economic efficiency”4 to vari-
ous aspects of the law. If this fact had been called to Joe’s attention, he
would not have liked it. He would have wanted the instructors of such
courses to first impart to their students an understanding of the historical
origins and hidden implicit assumptions underlying any evaluative criteria
that they would later be encouraged to use to assess laws or to suggest the
contours of appropriate legal reforms. It is in this spirit of critical reflec-
tion that I write this article and dedicate it to Joe’s memory.
Law and Economics courses are sometimes criticized for inadequately
explaining and then summarily endorsing the use of the normative crite-
rion of “economic efficiency” to evaluate policies and then applying this
criterion in a superficial and biased manner to pejoratively label most
governmental market interventions and wealth redistribution measures as
inefficient.5 Those critics argue that the efficiency criterion is not well
defined and allows for result-oriented manipulation by analysts, and that
it is also often difficult or impossible to obtain sufficiently reliable data to
meaningfully apply the criterion. In addition, they argue the criterion has
a pronounced bias in favor of the interests of the wealthiest members of
society and does not accord any respect to rights.6 They also argue that
these severe shortcomings of the criterion are not made sufficiently clear
to students to enable them in their later studies and careers to effectively
counter policy recommendations that are based upon dubious efficiency
assessments.7
There is considerable merit to these criticisms, and as Joe McKnight
surely would have noted, consideration of the history of the introduction
of Law and Economics courses into law school curricula is helpful in un-
derstanding why the shortcomings of the efficiency criteria are often un-
deremphasized in those courses. It is troubling to learn that much of the
early advocacy and financial support provided in the 1970s and afterward
for the introduction of Law and Economics courses into law school cur-
pects of the legal system as “Law and Economics courses,” although such courses are
sometimes offered under different though similar titles such as the “Economic Analysis of
Law” (the course title used at the SMU Dedman School of Law where I teach), “Law and
Economic Analysis,” etc.
4. When I use the terms “economic efficiency” or “efficiency” in this essay I am con-
sistently referring to the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion that is the evaluative criterion
generally applied in practice and not to the Pareto-efficiency criterion, which because of its
unanimity requirement has very little practical application. I will discuss the Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency criterion in some detail infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 1; see also McCluskey et al., supra note 1, at
298–99.
6. See, e.g., Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudence Logic of Late Capital-
ism, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 931, 940 (2004); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximiza-
tion as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
7. See e.g., Anup Malani, The Future of Law and Economics: Essays by Ten Law
School Scholars, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/future-
law-and-economics-essays-ten-law-school-scholars [https://perma.cc/7Q8U-P3P5]; see also
McCluskey et al., supra note 1, at 308.
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ricula, as well as for the broader use of the efficiency criterion in legisla-
tive, regulatory, and judicial decision-making often in the guise of “cost-
benefit analysis,”8 has been shown to be directly or indirectly due to the
efforts of certain wealthy individuals who embraced a right-wing liberta-
rian political orientation and whose financial interests would be furthered
by a more widespread embrace of the efficiency criterion.9 The fact that
several ideologically-oriented foundations established by these individu-
als provided much of the financial support in the 1970s and afterward for
many law schools’ Law and Economics courses, and for various judicial
and regulatory workshops that promoted efficiency as an important social
interest,10 suggests that the broad and uncritical embrace of the efficiency
criterion that often characterizes these courses and workshops is not just
a mere oversight but was instead actively encouraged by those persons
promoting and sometimes later offering those courses and workshops.11
These criticisms call into some question conventional Law and Eco-
nomics courses that rest heavily upon application of the efficiency crite-
rion. However, in my opinion, these criticisms can be adequately
addressed through relatively modest pedagogical changes and do not jus-
tify the more radical measure of eliminating these otherwise useful clas-
ses from law school curricula. My experience in teaching Law and
Economics courses for over twenty-five years here at the SMU Dedman
School of Law is that it is possible to provide law students with a succinct
yet fairly comprehensive and critical introduction to the concept of eco-
nomic efficiency that not only explains the criterion and apprises students
of its current widespread application in policy analysis but also helps
them to understand the numerous and severe conceptual, empirical, and
normative shortcomings of that criterion.
It is important for teachers of Law and Economics courses to explain
and critique the concept of economic efficiency in some detail at the out-
set so that the students will then understand why efficiency assessments
of policies are often useless or even positively misleading. This coverage
is necessary to prepare students to be able to respond effectively to the
policy arguments that they will encounter in various contexts in their
8. The phrases “cost-benefit analysis” or “benefit-cost analysis” are simply synony-
mous phrases that describe assessing a policy measure by its economic efficiency as mea-
sured by the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion that is discussed in detail infra Part II. The
same wealthy and politically influential persons that promoted the introduction of effi-
ciency-oriented Law and Economics courses into law school curricula in the 1970s also
supported the promulgation by the Reagan administration in 1981 of Executive Order
12291, which required many proposed executive branch regulatory initiatives to be sup-
ported by a cost-benefit analysis showing them to be economically efficient. See generally
JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE
RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 100, 102, 107–10 (2016); Exec. Order No. 12, 291, 3 C.F.R.
§ 127 (1981). Despite the shortcomings of the economic efficiency criterion that I discuss
herein, cost-benefit analysis has since become deeply embedded in federal regulatory pol-
icy. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE (2002).
9. MAYER, supra note 8, at 107–10.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 109.
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other law school courses and during their later professional careers that
are based on dubious efficiency assessments, whether couched in the
jargon of cost-benefit analysis or otherwise. In this brief essay offered in
tribute to the work of Joe McKnight I will attempt to highlight the major
conceptual and empirical difficulties that one will face when attempting
to assess the efficiency or inefficiency of a particular policy, and I will
discuss what is normatively problematic about using this criterion as an
evaluative standard even in those few instances where these conceptual
and measurement difficulties can somehow be overcome.
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CRITERION DEFINED
“Efficiency” is a protean term that means different things in different
contexts. In the physical sciences, the concept of technical efficiency—the
idea of achieving the maximum possible amount of a desired output from
given amounts of various inputs—is obviously an attractive normative cri-
terion for evaluating machines and production processes. Where the goal
of a process is a single, well-defined output, the efficiency with which
costly inputs can be turned into that output rather than wasted is of cen-
tral importance. Who could argue with, for example, evaluating an engine
largely by the proportion of the fuel energy that it is able to convert to
useful work rather than being lost in friction, vibration, or radiation of
heat energy? The obvious advantages of turning particular inputs into
useful outputs in a technically efficient manner has consequently given
the generic term “efficiency” a positive connotation in the popular
imagination.
The particular variation of the efficiency concept that is generally ap-
plied in assessing the economic consequences of policies is what econo-
mists call “Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.”12 The Kaldor–Hicks efficiency
criterion has a straightforward and intuitively appealing definition. If the
aggregate benefits of a policy to those persons favorably impacted by it,
as measured by their willingness to pay for those benefits if they were
required to do so, exceed the aggregate costs of that policy imposed upon
those persons unfavorably impacted by it, again as measured by their
willingness to pay if required to do so to avoid those costs, the policy is
then regarded as a “Kaldor–Hicks improvement” and is often more collo-
quially described as simply being economically efficient or as resulting in
an increase in social wealth.13 Or, alternatively, the policy can be de-
scribed as satisfying the “cost-benefit” test.14 There is no additional re-
quirement that compensation be paid by the policy’s beneficiaries to
those persons burdened in order for that policy to be a Kaldor–Hicks
improvement or justified by the cost-benefit criterion. It is sufficient if the
12. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17–18 (8th ed. 2011).
13. See id. at 17.
14. See Gregory Crespi, Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Choosing Between Offer
Prices and Asking Prices as the Appropriate Measure of Willingness to Pay, 39 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 429, 429 (2006) [hereinafter Crespi (2006)].
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aggregate benefits so measured exceed the aggregate costs. If a resource
allocation is reached where no further Kaldor–Hicks improvements are
possible, then that allocation is described as being “Kaldor–Hicks effi-
cient,” or, equivalently, as being “efficient” or “wealth maximizing” rela-
tive to any possible re-allocation of resources.15
The most straightforward application of this economic efficiency crite-
rion, one that is usually presented early on in Law and Economics courses
to illustrate the underlying concepts, is to conduct a geometric analysis of
the efficiency of various forms of governmental intervention into a hypo-
thetical free market that otherwise satisfies the behavioral and institu-
tional assumptions for perfect competition. Using a simple supply-and-
demand graph depicting such a market in competitive equilibrium,16 the
aggregate benefits of the existence of such a market to the buyers of the
good or service can be shown to be the size of the triangle17 under the
demand curve and above the equilibrium price line. This area represents
the aggregate willingness to pay of those persons who buy in this market
over and above the market equilibrium price they are required to pay for
the good or service. Each of these buyers will obtain a benefit from their
purchase equal to the difference between their personal “reservation
price” for the good or service18 and its equilibrium price. The aggregate
benefit to all of these buyers is referred to as the “consumer surplus”
generated by this market.19
In a similar fashion, the aggregate benefits of the existence of this mar-
ket to the sellers can be shown by the size of the triangle20 above the
marginal cost-based supply curve and below the equilibrium price line,
with each of these sellers obtaining a benefit from their sale equal to the
difference between their personal reservation price for the good or ser-
vice21 and its equilibrium price. The aggregate benefit to all of these sell-
ers is referred to as the “producer surplus” generated by this market.22 It
is then geometrically demonstrated to students that various forms of gov-
ernmental intervention into the operation of a free market that go be-
yond the simple background enforcement of property rights and
contractual obligations and restrictions upon collusion—for example,
measures such as the imposition of price ceilings, price floors, sales taxes,
income or payroll taxes, subsidies to buyers and/or sellers, or the allow-
15. POSNER, supra note 12, at 17.
16. Id. at 11.
17. This area will not be precisely triangular unless the demand curve is a straight line,
but this fact does not affect the usefulness of this framework for illustrating this basic point
regarding the determination of the size of the consumer surplus. See id. fig. 1.2.
18. A buyer’s reservation price for a good or service represents the highest price that
they would be willing to pay for that good or service rather than to have to do without it.
19. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 19.
20. This area will not be precisely triangular unless the supply curve is a straight line,
but this fact does not affect the usefulness of this framework for illustrating this basic point
regarding the determination of the size of the producer surplus.
21. A seller’s reservation price for a good or service represents the lowest price that
they would be willing to accept for that good or service rather than to retain it unsold.
22. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 358.
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ance of collusion among buyers or sellers—will generally reduce the com-
bined consumer and producer surplus that the market generates.
Therefore, such governmental interventions into market processes are
usually judged to be inefficient or described as failing the cost-benefit
test.
It is also easily demonstrated that under this willingness to pay-based
valuation framework any simple transfer of wealth from one group of
persons to another through one of these market interventions will have
an aggregate cost to those persons burdened that is exactly equal to its
aggregate benefits to those persons benefitted. Since any transfer of
wealth will, in practice, necessarily involve some transaction costs and in-
efficiencies in arranging and carrying out those wealth transfers, when
those transaction costs and inefficiencies are taken into account the redis-
tribution of wealth will be wealth-reducing and therefore inefficient.
I recognize that most teachers of Law and Economics courses, at about
this point in the class, will then attempt to make clear to students that not
all markets satisfy the perfectly competitive market assumptions that un-
derlie these conclusions as to the general inefficiency of governmental
interventions that alter market outcomes or redistribute wealth. Teachers
can and usually do demonstrate through use of the same basic supply-
and-demand framework that there can be market failures when there are
positive or negative externalities of production or consumption that are
not captured by the relevant supply or demand curves, or sellers or buy-
ers significantly depart from rational actor assumptions. Under such cir-
cumstances markets may fail to reach efficient results, and appropriate
governmental interventions may to some extent rectify these inefficien-
cies and increase overall social wealth. Another way that this insight is
sometimes communicated to students is to explain that some governmen-
tal regulatory measures that first appear not to be cost-justified may actu-
ally satisfy the cost-benefit criterion if the impacts of those measures on
external costs and benefits are also quantified and included in the overall
assessment. But these important caveats as to the possible inefficiencies
resulting from market failures, and their potential amelioration through
appropriate governmental actions, are then often downplayed or over-
looked entirely later in the course when various laws, and in particular
various governmental market interventions, are examined for their effi-
ciency or inefficiency. In addition, the points that I will discuss below re-
garding why the use of the efficiency criterion as an evaluative standard is
problematic, even in those contexts where all of the restrictive assump-
tions of perfect competition are satisfied and when all costs and benefits
are internalized, are generally covered inadequately if at all.
The economic efficiency criterion and its widely used cost-benefit anal-
ysis embodiment do have some appeal as a normative standard because
of the association of this criterion in the popular mind with the relatively
unproblematic concept of technical efficiency that is utilized in the physi-
cal sciences. But as Richard Posner has noted, this evaluative criterion
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also has appeal because it is a criterion with a precisely defined algorithm
for quantifying and aggregating disparate impacts.23 By utilizing the will-
ingness to pay-based measure for valuing all policy impacts the efficiency
criterion has the substantial operational advantage of avoiding the severe,
if not insurmountable, measurement difficulties and highly subjective
value judgments inherent in applying utilitarian happiness impact mea-
sures, valuing the abridgment of Kantian personal autonomy constraints,
or harmonizing the different aspects of more complex multi-factor evalu-
ative criteria.24 The willingness to pay-based algorithm of efficiency anal-
ysis certainly makes valuing policy impacts much simpler than it would be
under these other criteria, to say the least. However, if its properties are
not then developed in some detail so that the more subtle yet severe con-
ceptual, empirical, and normative limitations of the criterion are made
clear, this criterion which consistently demonstrates the inefficiency of
governmental interventions into perfectly competitive markets and of
governmental income or wealth redistribution measures will implicitly
convey to students the broad and misleading message that a limited, lais-
sez-faire government that provides a basic framework of law and order,
but does not otherwise interfere with market processes or redistribute
market-generated incomes, will better facilitate the general welfare than
will a more interventionist government. This simplistic, pro-free-market
orientation that the uncritical use of the efficiency criterion encourages
often implicitly suffuses the remainder of the Law and Economics course
as various legal doctrines in property law, contract law, tort law, corpo-
rate governance, etc., and various governmental regulatory efforts, are in
turn examined for their efficiency or inefficiency. This repeated assess-
ment of legal rules by the efficiency criterion when its conceptual and
empirical shortcomings and problematic normative basis have not been
first fully explained to students is what those persons who criticize these
Law and Economics courses as superficial and biased in favor of the in-
terests of the wealthiest members of society find most objectionable.
Law and Economics courses do not have to be taught this way. It is
entirely possible for a teacher who is willing to devote a week or so of
class coverage to the economic efficiency criterion to properly explain
that concept and demonstrate its wide usage, yet do so in a critical man-
ner that makes clear to students its numerous shortcomings. The students
then, both in their studies and later professional careers, will hopefully
have a greater capability to effectively refute arguments regarding a pol-
23. For discussion of the advantages of the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion relative
to either utilitarian or Kantian-type evaluative criteria, see generally Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter
Posner (1979)]. Posner does a much better job in that article demonstrating the weaknesses
of utilitarian or Kantian evaluative criteria than in defending the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency
criterion, and moreover, his defense essentially only addresses the major normative criti-
cisms made of that criterion and not the several conceptual or empirical problems that I
discuss infra Part III. See also POSNER, supra note 12, at 15–20.
24. See generally Posner (1979), supra note 23, at 129–30.
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icy’s merits or weaknesses that rest upon dubious efficiency assessments
or cost-benefit analyses.
Let me briefly discuss the numerous serious problems that are inherent
in the use of the efficiency criterion to evaluate policies. I will first ad-
dress the substantial and arguably overwhelming conceptual and empiri-
cal difficulties that are involved in reaching a meaningful quantitative
assessment of the efficiency or inefficiency of a policy. I will then address
the problematic assumptions involved in using efficiency as a normative
criterion for assessing the merits of a policy even if one is somehow able
to meaningfully quantify the policy impacts.
III. CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED
IN MEASURING WILLINGNESS TO PAY
The most severe problems that are commonly encountered in quanti-
fying the willingness to pay based impacts of a proposed policy measure
are the following six difficulties:
A. The practical limitation that it is usually not possible to survey
more than a modest-sized sample of the likely affected current popula-
tion when measuring a proposed policy’s impacts, and that it is obviously
impossible to survey those persons who will later be impacted by the pol-
icy but who are not yet born at the time of its implementation;
B. Resolving the question of whether to measure the willingness to
pay of the persons surveyed through their offer prices or instead through
their asking prices;
C. The difficulty of obtaining honest and accurate measures of will-
ingness to pay from those persons surveyed;
D. The problem of determining the appropriate discount rate to ap-
ply to future policy impacts before aggregating them with current
impacts;
E. The problem posed by the possibility that the preferences of some
or all of the persons impacted by a policy may be endogenous with re-
spect to that policy rather than stable and exogenously determined; and
perhaps most intractably,
F. The problem that one of the long-term impacts of any policy what-
soever is that its implementation will eventually lead to a different ge-
netic identity at the time of conception than would otherwise be created
for all persons born thereafter through the end of eternity—i.e., the pol-
icy will eventually have universal “person-altering consequences” in that
all of the persons who will later come into being after some relatively
short period of time after the implementation of a policy will do so only
because of the particular policy that was implemented, and these obvi-
ously momentous policy consequences of existence itself for those per-
sons will somehow have to be taken into account in valuing those
impacts.
Let me briefly address each of these several difficulties in turn.
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A. SAMPLING LIMITATIONS
For the basic supply-and-demand market model commonly used to
geometrically introduce the concept of economic efficiency in Law and
Economics courses, the reservation prices of all of the potential buyers
and sellers are assumed to be known and represented by the positions of
the demand and supply curves, respectively. In that event, the problem of
calculating the willingness to pay-based impacts of a governmental mar-
ket intervention is reduced to a simple matter of addition and subtrac-
tion. For real-world attempts to assess the efficiency of policies, however,
the willingness of the impacted persons to pay to experience (or to avoid)
the consequences of the policies are not so given. The exact positions of
the relevant supply and demand curves are generally not known, and the
contours of those curves will have to be empirically determined.
In practice, unfortunately, whoever is directed to assess a policy’s effi-
ciency or inefficiency is usually not provided with anywhere near the re-
sources that would be necessary to survey even a substantial fraction of
the living individuals who would be impacted to some extent by the pol-
icy, who may easily number in the millions or more for significant govern-
mental policies, and of course the analyst will be unable to survey those
persons who will eventually be impacted by the policy once they come
into existence but who have not yet been born at the time that the pol-
icy’s impacts are being assessed. The analyst will typically be limited to
surveying the responses of, at most, a relatively small sample of the cur-
rent population and then will have to make projections based upon those
findings in order to estimate the aggregate willingness to pay of the entire
current population. Based also on those sample survey findings, the ana-
lyst will have to speculate as to how the affected members of future gen-
erations will regard the policy impacts and then offer willingness to pay-
based estimates for those future persons accordingly. With all of this pro-
jection and speculation from an often very small survey database, even if
relatively sophisticated stratified sampling techniques are utilized to en-
hance the representativeness of the selected sample, this will sharply limit
the confidence that one can have in these estimates.
B. DETERMINING WHETHER TO USE OFFER PRICES OR INSTEAD
ASKING PRICES TO MEASURE WILLINGNESS TO PAY
The use of the simple blanket phrase “willingness to pay” masks an
important yet unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) issue in efficiency
analysis. When attempting to ascertain the willingness to pay of a person
who is benefitted by a policy, is the proper question to pose how much
the person would be willing to pay to receive those benefits—commonly
referred to as their “offer price” for those benefits—or is the proper
question instead how much that person would demand to give up those
benefits once they had been conferred upon them—commonly referred
to as their “asking price”? Similarly, and more importantly, when at-
tempting to ascertain the willingness to pay of a person who would be
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injured by a policy to avoid its costs, is the proper question to pose how
much that person would be willing to pay to avoid the imposition of those
costs—again their offer price—or instead how much that person would
demand for their consent to have those costs imposed upon them—their
asking price?
Unfortunately, the manner in which the willingness to pay question is
posed may significantly affect the answers obtained. Depending on the
framing of the question, these answers may differ dramatically in size,
particularly when attempting to measure the impacts of a policy on those
persons for which the policy is perceived as imposing substantial costs.
The reason for this is that while a person’s offer price to avoid a policy’s
costs is necessarily constrained by the amount of their wealth and by what
other objectives they will want to use their wealth to satisfy their asking
price is not so constrained and has no necessary upper limit. If a person is
highly reluctant to consent to implementation of a particular policy as a
matter of principle then that person’s asking price for their consent could
be very large or even infinite in the sense that they might refuse to give
their consent to the policy’s implementation for any amount of money.25
An efficiency assessment of a policy will obviously not provide meaning-
ful guidance to policymakers if there are one or more infinite costs in-
cluded in the balance that will dominate all other valuations.
An analyst conducting an efficiency analysis will have to choose
whether to use offer prices or instead asking prices for their measure-
ments of willingness to pay or whether instead to use some combination
of the two forms of measurement. The efficiency criterion would be more
useful if there was a theoretically “correct” choice here as to the proper
questions to pose so that analysts would not be able to covertly manipu-
late the questions used in order to reach a result that they favored for
other reasons. But no one has yet offered a convincing and definitive res-
olution of this offer/asking price problem that can be incorporated into
standard analytical practice given the inherent vagueness of the willing-
ness to pay efficiency formulation.26
One may, for example, choose to look to the operation of markets for
some guidance as to how to measure willingness to pay, given that effi-
ciency analysis is often regarded as an attempt to apply market-like as-
sessment principles to evaluate governmental policies that primarily
impact persons in non-market settings. Buyers in markets will pay no
more than their offer prices for the benefits of having a good or service,
and this suggests that offer prices are perhaps the most appropriate mea-
sures of willingness to pay, at least for policy beneficiaries. On the other
hand, sellers in a market do not have to part with their goods or services
25. Consider, for example, the very large asking prices that might be expressed by
some persons sincerely opposed to abortion as a matter of principle with regard to a policy
whereby the federal government facilitated and fully financed all abortions.
26. For further discussion of the conundrum posed by the choice between using offer
prices or instead asking prices in efficiency analysis, see generally Crespi (2006), supra note
14.
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unless their asking prices are met, suggesting that asking prices may be
the proper measure to use for valuing the costs imposed by policies. So if
efficiency analysis is to be done in a manner that most closely emulates
the workings of markets, perhaps offer prices should be used to measure
benefits and asking prices to measure costs.
In practice, however, almost all efficiency analyses27 use offer prices to
measure both the benefits and costs of the policies being considered. But
this approach seems to be based primarily upon the desire of analysts to
avoid the possibility of having the assessment skewed heavily against the
policy in question by very large or even infinite asking prices that perhaps
only a very small minority of the adversely impacted persons would de-
clare rather than upon some credible theoretical argument as to why the
adversely impacted persons’ offer prices instead of their asking prices are
the “correct” measure of a policy’s negative impacts.28 This lack of clear
guidance as to how willingness to pay should be measured, and the possi-
ble sensitivity of the conclusions reached in an efficiency analysis as to
how the willingness to pay questions are posed, greatly undercuts the use-
fulness of the efficiency criterion as an objective measure of the merits of
policies.
C. OBTAINING HONEST AND ACCURATE RESPONSES
Even once an analyst has determined the sample of the impacted popu-
lation to survey and has made their choice between using offer price or
instead asking price measures of willingness to pay, there remains the
question as to whether the responses obtained can be trusted to honestly
and accurately reflect true willingness to pay. There are several reasons
why this may not be the case.
First of all, the questions posed to respondents with regard to the im-
pacts of a proposed policy are usually not the sort of questions that peo-
ple are asked to answer on a regular basis and therefore have some
experience to draw upon in responding. Being asked how much one
would be willing to pay, for example, for more stringent limits on the
emission of certain toxic chemicals, or for a worldwide treaty banning
blue whale hunting, or for a better freeway connection in a neighboring
city that one occasionally visits by automobile, is not like the normal rou-
tine shopping expenditure decisions that one makes every day. People
may give answers to such unfamiliar hypothetical survey questions that
are not very well considered with regard to all of their competing prefer-
ences, particularly since they are not subject to the discipline of actually
having to pay the declared amounts for the benefits of the policy or hav-
ing to accept the declared compensation for its costs. Economists gener-
ally favor on reliability grounds the use of “revealed preference” data
that reflects actual spending behavior over merely hypothetical survey re-
27. Many of which are done by governmental agencies and styled as a “cost-benefit
analysis,” a common and synonymous term for a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency assessment.
28. See generally Crespi (2006), supra note 14.
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sponses, but an efficiency analyst will unfortunately usually only have
such hypothetical survey responses with which to work.29
A second problem here is that some of the persons surveyed may delib-
erately misstate their willingness to pay for strategic reasons. A person
who would benefit from a policy has an incentive to overstate the size of
this benefit in response to a survey question in an attempt to make the
policy’s implementation more likely, particularly since they will not then
be required to pay this stated sum. Similarly, a person who would be bur-
dened by a policy has an incentive to overstate the size of this burden in
an attempt to discourage the implementation of the policy. On the other
hand, the persons surveyed might be concerned that their responses
might somehow provide a basis for later public assessments against (or
compensation payments made to) them, which would encourage the ben-
eficiaries to now understate the benefits but would further encourage
those persons burdened by the policy to further overstate those bur-
dens.30 All of these strategic considerations that may be in play will un-
dercut the confidence an analyst can have in the accuracy of their
efficiency calculations.
D. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE
Some of the impacts of a policy will occur immediately, but other im-
pacts will not occur for some period of time. This raises the difficult ques-
tion of how to aggregate the different benefit and cost impacts of a policy
that occur during different time periods into a single bottom-line figure.
The standard approach taken in efficiency analysis is to discount all fu-
ture impacts to a smaller present value before their aggregation in a man-
ner similar to what is done in conventional finance calculations of the
present value of streams of future cash flows. Use of this procedure then
presents the question as to what is the appropriate discount rate.
Ideally, the benefits or costs borne by each person impacted by a policy
in each future time period would be discounted by the impacted person’s
personal rate of time preference with regard to events occurring in that
future period as compared to the current time period. Once again, sam-
pling limitations will generally preclude such an individualized assess-
ment and use of personal discount rates, and the usual convention in
efficiency analysis is to use a single discount rate for discounting all future
impacts of a policy on all affected persons to a commensurate present
value. The chosen discount rate usually reflects either the analyst’s esti-
mate of the average rate of time preference of the entire affected popula-
tion over the relevant time period, or instead some bond market-based
interest rate(s) paid in the market for long-run riskless investments over
the relevant time period, such as the interest rate(s) on long-term U.S.
Treasury bonds of the appropriate maturity, or instead some estimate of
29. See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1603, 1613–15 (2013).
30. Crespi (2006), supra note 14, at 448.
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the average annual rate of return on private invested capital over the
relevant time period, or some combination of more than one of the above
measures.31 In addition, there is controversy both regarding whether such
finance theory-based discount rates are appropriate for valuing very long-
term policy consequences that even if quite large in magnitude when they
occur will be reduced to insignificance by even a relatively small discount
rate, and there is controversy regarding what discount rate is appropriate
when the future impacts being valued are of the nature of loss of human
life rather than merely financial consequences.32
The lack of clear agreement as to what discount rates should be used in
efficiency analysis presents a significant problem because the assessment
of policies that have substantial long-term impacts (which, as I will dis-
cuss below, includes all policies whatsoever because of their inevitable
and universal genetic person-altering consequences) is very sensitive to
the discount rate applied to these long-term impacts before aggregating
them with current impacts.33 The sensitivity of the results reached in
many analyses involving long-term policy consequences to an analyst’s
relatively unconstrained choice of a discount rate serves to undercut the
objective significance of the conclusions.
E. VALUING POLICY IMPACTS WHEN PREFERENCES ARE
ENDOGENOUS
A common assumption made in efficiency analysis is that people’s un-
derlying preference structures are exogenous with regard to the impact of
policies. In other words, it is assumed that people will value the impacts
of a policy at the same amount whether they express their willingness to
pay before or after they experience the policy’s impacts. But for a couple
of reasons this may not actually be the case.
First of all, behavioral economists have established that in many in-
stances people exhibit an “endowment effect” in their valuations where
they will value a good or service that they own more than they would
value that same good or service if they did not yet own it, even if their
underlying preference structures with regard to the relative merits of that
good or service otherwise remain essentially unchanged after they take
ownership.34 In such instances, the aggregate willingness to pay for the
31. For discussion of the problem of choosing an appropriate discount rate for use in
efficiency analysis, see generally Gregory Scott Crespi, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Not a Suitable
Approach for Evaluating Climate Regulation Policies, 22 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLI-
MATE AND ENV’T 227 (2011) [hereinafter Crespi (2011)].
32. Id.
33. Id. For example, a policy whose costs occur largely in the near-term and whose
benefits are mostly long-term, such as many environmental protection policies, and whose
benefits just barely exceed its costs using a 3% discount rate, will appear to be much more
wealth-increasing if a 1% discount rate is used, but may appear to be highly inefficient
under a 7% discount rate.
34. Russell Kordokin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U.L. REV.
1227, 1228 (2002).
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benefits of a policy will vary depending on whether that willingness to pay
is expressed before or after the policy consequences are experienced.
Secondly, and presenting more difficulties as a conceptual matter, it is
possible that the implementation of a policy may significantly alter the
preference structures of some of the people affected, perhaps dramati-
cally so. Stated in a more technical manner, preferences may be endoge-
nous to a significant extent with regard to the policy under consideration.
If this is the case, then it presents the question of whether an analyst
attempting to ascertain the efficiency or inefficiency of a policy should
determine the impacted persons’ willingness to pay on the basis of their
pre-policy implementation preference structures or instead on the basis
of their different post-policy implementation preference structures. In
some instances, the use of pre-policy implementation preference struc-
tures as the valuation baseline would seem to be more appropriate,35 but
in other instances, the use of their post-policy implementation preference
structures would appear to be more appropriate.36 There is a lack of
agreement as to the proper way to address the problem of potentially
endogenous preferences, as a general matter, and this issue as to the ap-
propriate set of preference structures upon which to base the policy valu-
ations creates yet another opportunity for a result-oriented analyst to
manipulate the results of the assessment.
F. VALUING POLICY IMPACTS IN LIGHT OF THE PERSON-ALTERING
CONSEQUENCES OF POLICIES
The noted and recently deceased British philosopher Derek Parfit has
elaborated in some detail regarding what he refers to as the “non-identity
problem.”37 This is a strikingly novel and greatly under-appreciated in-
sight that is of major significance for policy assessment. I have relabeled
this problem with what I regard as a more apt moniker as the “problem
of person-altering consequences” in several articles that I have written in
recent years for economists, lawyers, and other policy analysts rather than
for the professional philosophers that were Parfit’s target audience.38
35. Consider, as one extreme example, a policy that involved a forced brain lobotomy
for one person who opposes that operation. It would appear more appropriate to most
people to value the costs of that policy by that person’s willingness to pay to avoid that
operation that results from the pre-lobotomy preference structure than to value the costs
by willingness to pay based on their post-lobotomy preferences! For an extended discus-
sion of the problems posed for efficiency analysis by the possibility of endogenous prefer-
ences, see generally Gregory Scott Crespi, The Endogeniety Problem in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 8 GEO. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 109–18 (2010) [hereinafter Crespi (2010)].
36. For example, policies that impose educational requirements on persons or that
provide them with environmental amenities that they have not previously experienced
have been shown to sometimes alter preference structures in a way that is more favorable
to those policies. For an extended discussion of the problems posed for efficiency analysis
by the possibility of endogenous preferences, see generally Crespi (2010), supra note 35.
37. See generally DEREK PARFIT, The Non-Identity Problem, in REASONS AND PER-
SONS 351–80 (1984).
38. See, e.g., Crespi (2010), supra note 35, at 118–44; Gregory Scott Crespi, The Fatal
Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10703 (2008) [herein-
after Crespi (2008)]; see generally Gregory Scott Crespi, What’s Wrong with Dumping Ra-
330 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
This interesting problem results from the fact that even a policy with
very minor social impacts will surely have enough effect on some human
behavior to at least slightly alter the details of at least one successful act
of human reproduction so that the female’s egg is fertilized by a different
male sperm, out of the hundreds of millions of sperm released in a typical
male ejaculation, than the specific sperm that would have succeeded in
fertilizing the egg had the precise timing or some other detail of the act of
conception not been slightly altered by the policy. This different sperm-
egg fertilization will then lead to a person being conceived with a differ-
ent genetic identity than would otherwise have been the case. In other
words, now a different person will eventually be born because of the pol-
icy that was undertaken. As this genetically different person matures and
goes through life, they will surely affect other persons in ways that are
different, perhaps radically so, than would have been the case had the
policy not been implemented and had the other person been conceived
and born instead through a different sperm-egg fusion.
The—change of events arising from a genetically different person going
through their life will then also surely alter some later acts of conception
by other pairs of parents in a similar fashion, leading over time to an
exponentially growing cascade of genetic alterations of the persons later
conceived, all stemming from the initial minor policy impact. After some
period of time, one that is likely measured in mere decades rather than
centuries, the entire human population conceived and born for the rest of
eternity will all have different genetic identities than the alternative fu-
ture population that would have been conceived and born had the initial
policy in question not been implemented. The policy will therefore even-
tually have what I describe as universal person-altering consequences.
Another way to put this fascinating though somewhat disturbing insight
articulated by Parfit is that one result of any policy whatsoever, even one
with very minor initial impacts, will be to eventually create a future
human population extending for all eternity thereafter for whom that pol-
icy was a necessary condition of their existence. In other words, none of
the members of that future population would have been conceived and
born had the policy at issue not been implemented. This inarguable fact
creates a real dilemma for attempts to estimate the willingness to pay for
the policy’s benefit and cost impacts of the many members of that eternal
parade of future generations.
One would expect these future persons to each place a very high value
on a policy whose effects were a necessary condition of their existence,
certainly if asking price measures are utilized. The expressed value would
likely be very high even if necessarily constrained offer prices are aggre-
gated, and even if the policy in other ways had significant adverse effects
dioactive Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Ethical and Policy Analysis Implications of
Person-Altering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10873 (2007) [here-
inafter Crespi (2007)].
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on their lives.39 These untold billions or perhaps even trillions of future
persons would surely place in the aggregate an astronomically high value
on the policy that resulted in their existence even if some of the other
consequences of that policy were significantly adverse to their interests.
Even if those future valuations are heavily discounted to a current pre-
sent value, the aggregate benefits are still likely to be massive (although
obviously impossible to precisely estimate), very likely large enough to
greatly outweigh any negative policy impacts upon the members of the
current generation.
In other words, any policy option whatsoever, including the null option
of doing nothing and maintaining the status quo, will result in massive net
benefits of uncertain magnitude because of the particular very large fu-
ture population that the policy will bring into existence over time, regard-
less of any negative impacts upon the current population. This fact will
render efficiency assessments rather useless for distinguishing among al-
ternative policy options, and policymakers are of course likely to reject
out of hand any evaluation method that essentially ignores negative pol-
icy impacts upon existing persons.
So what can be done here to salvage the usefulness of economic effi-
ciency as an evaluative standard, given this seemingly insuperable diffi-
culty? Analyses of the efficiency of policies that take into account future
consequences for persons not yet conceived when the policy is first imple-
mented are now invariably conducted on the basis of the demonstrably
false assumption that the same future persons will come into being
whether or not the policy under consideration is implemented. With this
facilitating assumption, the policy impacts on the wealth of future persons
can then be assessed against the hypothetical baseline alternative of those
same future persons coming into existence but not experiencing the pol-
icy’s impacts, which could then lead to either positive or negative esti-
mated valuations of the policy impacts for each of those many future
persons depending on the nature of those individual impacts. Those im-
pacts are then all discounted to present values for aggregation with the
impacts upon current persons.
This approach is untenable. This facilitating assumption that the same
future persons will come into existence whether or not the policy in ques-
tion is implemented is not merely a typical simplifying assumption that
has been chosen in order to make otherwise difficult calculations some-
what more mathematically tractable without changing their basic charac-
ter. This is instead the far more dubious use of a hypothetical
counterfactual baseline for assessing policy impacts that cannot possibly
occur since it is beyond reasonable argument that any policy will have the
dramatic person-altering consequences that I have described that will
eventually create an entirely different future population. Assessing the
impacts of a policy on future persons as compared to the future impacts
39. See, e.g., Crespi (2007), supra note 38.
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of maintaining the status quo is unavoidably an apples-to-oranges com-
parison involving two different groups of people, for each of which the
policy alternative being evaluated is a necessary condition of their exis-
tence. It is indeed a big problem for willingness to pay-based policy evalu-
ation when all policy options whatsoever will generate massive net
benefits of indeterminate size, but this is a problem that simply must be
faced. Those many efficiency analyses that simply assume away the prob-
lem of person-altering consequences by pretending that it does not exist
are unfortunately not relevant to the real choices at hand between policy
options, all of which do have these person-altering consequences.
I have given this question considerable thought, but I have not so far
come up with any way to incorporate person-altering consequences into
efficiency analysis without leading to the counterintuitive and unhelpful
but seemingly unavoidable conclusion that massive but practically un-
quantifiable benefits will result for future generations that dwarf any im-
pacts upon existing persons, no matter what policies we pursue. This is
because those future persons that will eventually come into being after
any policy has been implemented will be created as a result of that policy
and would therefore likely deem the particular policy that is a necessary
condition of their existence to be of overriding significance. Even if the
numerous other conceptual and empirical problems of the efficiency cri-
terion that I have discussed above can somehow be resolved, I believe
that the problem posed for efficiency analysis by person-altering conse-
quences is likely fatal to that approach.
Given this fundamental problem with a willingness to pay-based valua-
tion approach it appears to be necessary to develop alternative evaluative
criteria that do not require valuing policy impacts upon specific future
persons. Trying to think outside of the box here, one possible approach
would be to simply assume that the massive benefits of uncertain magni-
tude for the eternal parade of future persons that will result from any
policy whatsoever because of its person-altering consequences will in ef-
fect “cancel out” when comparing alternative policies, including the null
option of not implementing any policy and continuing the status quo, and
therefore only the impacts upon current persons need to be considered
and compared in policy assessment. This approach would make policy
assessment far more tractable by obviating altogether the need to assess
long-term consequences for future persons. However, this approach is un-
satisfactory because it would unduly favor those policies that provide cur-
rent benefits but impose large long-term costs for future persons,40 and it
would unduly disfavor those policies that impose current costs but pro-
40. Consider the ocean radioactive waste dumping policies considered in Crespi
(2007), supra note 38. Those seemingly short-sighted and highly irresponsible policies, de-
spite their likely significant and adverse long-term environmental consequences, would
surely receive massive approval from the many future persons for whom they would be
necessary conditions of their existence.
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vide large long-term benefits for future persons.41 Effectively ignoring
policy consequences for future persons in this manner does not appear to
be any more reasonable than the current practice of pretending that poli-
cies do not have person-altering consequences.
Another and more radical possible approach would be to develop eval-
uative criteria that focus on valuing future policy impacts not on the basis
of their impacts upon specific individuals but instead on their impact
upon the overall human race when it is viewed as a distinct entity that
exists apart from the specific individuals that comprise it. It is unclear,
however, what sorts of policy impacts upon this human race one would
want to consider that are not simply aggregations of the willingness to
pay-based impacts of the policy on individual persons, and it is unclear
how those “human race” impacts would be quantified.
Another even more radical tact might be to abandon consequentialist
approaches altogether and instead try to develop evaluative criteria that
are based upon a non-consequentialist assessment of the merits of the
goals being pursued by policy architects, rather than upon an assessment
of the policy consequences for individual human beings. But should we
really ignore the consequences for individuals in evaluating policies?
Who else matters? Or could we perhaps embrace criteria that are more
explicitly theological in character and that do not rest upon either the
intentions of the actors or the policy impacts upon human welfare but
only upon their congruence with God’s grand plan? But is there any
chance that we would be able to reach even a rough consensus on which
theological premises as to the nature of this grand plan are most
accurate?
Determining how to take person-altering consequences into account in
policy assessment is a very difficult question, and I concede that I do not
have the answers at hand. But it is clearly not a viable approach to, as
many analysts now do, simply ignore the problem these consequences
pose for efficiency analyses by making a demonstrably false assumption
as to the invariability of the genetic identity of future persons with regard
to policy impacts.
This interesting and difficult conundrum for policy analysis created by
person-altering consequences should be made clear to students as part of
their immersion in efficiency analysis. I have found that students find the
problem of person-altering consequences to be quite interesting, and with
just one or two examples presented they are usually quickly able to grasp
its great significance for undercutting the usefulness of conventional effi-
ciency analysis.
41. One example may be an environmental protection measure that conferred very
large benefits upon the members of future generations but that imposed small net costs on
current persons.
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IV. NORMATIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY CRITERION
Even if one is somehow able to overcome (or chooses to ignore) all of
the above-discussed measurement and conceptual difficulties involved in
trying to obtain a meaningful estimate of the aggregate willingness to
pay-based impacts of a policy, there is still the fundamental question
presented regarding whether economic efficiency is an appropriate nor-
mative criterion for assessing the merits of that policy. There are two ma-
jor concerns here that deserve more discussion in a Law and Economics
class than usually take place. These concerns are fortunately relatively
easy to convey to students in a succinct manner.
First of all, a person’s willingness to pay to experience (or to avoid) the
consequences of a policy are obviously not only a function of that per-
son’s preferences but also a function of that person’s wealth. The effi-
ciency criterion can be succinctly described as a “one-dollar, one-vote”
aggregate decision criterion. It is definitely not the widely embraced and
more democratic “one-person, one-vote” criterion, and the efficiency cri-
terion systematically gives more weight to the preferences of more afflu-
ent persons in proportion to their relative wealth in policy assessment.
Now one can argue that the amount of an individual’s wealth is posi-
tively correlated with their productivity and with other socially desirable
traits, at least to some substantial extent, and that this provides some so-
cial justification for giving greater weight in policy assessments to the
preferences of more wealthy individuals.42 But the relatively modest de-
gree of correlation between wealth and virtue obviously allows for many
exceptions. Many individuals are wealthy through inheritance or acciden-
tal good fortune without necessarily being productive or otherwise virtu-
ous (does anyone prominent come to mind here?), and some people are
productive or otherwise virtuous yet poor, and so arguments can easily be
made that would cut the other way against giving such overriding weight
to relative wealth differentials in making social policy decisions. It is
clearly a matter for ongoing and perhaps ultimately unresolvable debate
as to whether a willingness to pay-based decision-making criterion is
more appropriate, all things considered, than would be the more demo-
cratic alternative of giving equal weight to the preferences of each per-
son, or than would be, as another example, the alternative of adopting a
utilitarian-type criterion that focuses more directly upon the relative psy-
chological impacts of a policy upon different persons without regard to
their wealth.
There is a sophisticated and highly mathematical welfare economics
literature that is not usually assigned in Law and Economics courses be-
cause relatively few law students have both a sufficient economics back-
ground and a strong enough mathematical ability to benefit from that
42. This point is the central argument made by Richard Posner in his 1979 defense of
the economic efficiency criterion. See Posner (1979), supra note 23, at 123–125 (describing
and defending the economic efficiency criterion as the “wealth-maximization principle”).
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literature. That welfare economics scholarship is extensive and makes
clear that there are an infinite number of alternative “social welfare func-
tions” that could be used to measure and aggregate the impacts of a pol-
icy upon different persons in order to evaluate its merits, and this
literature analyzes in great depth the interesting and often quite subtle
properties of a number of different possible social welfare functions.43
The willingness to pay-based economic efficiency criterion is only one
possible social welfare function, only one of the many possible valuation
yardsticks, and moreover, it is a criterion with no special justification for
its use other than the fact that when it is applied using certain combina-
tions of offer prices and asking prices it closely parallels how the prices
for goods or services are set in competitive markets. The basic point as to
the arbitrariness of the choice of the economic efficiency criterion as an
evaluative standard from among the plethora of alternative social welfare
functions can be easily communicated to law students in a simple manner
without the need to delve into the mysteries of the Bergson–Samuelson
social welfare functions44 or the Arrow Impossibility Theorem45 or other
logical and mathematical complexities of welfare economics theory.
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, there are no “rights”
inherent in an efficiency calculation.46 If a person’s willingness to pay-
based assessment of the costs that a policy imposes upon them is ex-
ceeded by the net aggregate benefits conferred on the other impacted
persons, then the efficiency criterion will still endorse that policy no mat-
ter what the size or nature of the costs that are imposed upon that unfor-
tunate person; there are no rights inherent in this criterion that would
take precedence over these overall wealth effects. But the use of an eval-
uative criterion that does not recognize any rights except the right to vote
up to the limit of one’s willingness and ability to pay obviously coexists
uneasily with the fundamental values of our larger social and political
system, a social framework that is based on a Constitution that embraces
the idea of inalienable rights that are not to be infringed upon regardless
of benefits thereby conferred upon other persons, especially if willingness
43. See, e.g., Social Welfare Function, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Social_wefare_function [https://perma.cc/G2L9-UC8R] (citing the many seminal works in
that area of scholarship that are cited therein).
44. See PAUL SAMUELSON, Welfare Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ch. VIII, 203–57 (1983).
45. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 51 (2nd ed.
1963).
46. It has been argued that there is in fact a distribution of “rights” inherent in the
economic efficiency criterion and that this distribution is that the rights to goods and ser-
vices should be assigned to those persons who could put them to the highest-valued uses so
as to maximize overall social wealth. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 23, at 126–27. However,
most people would regard themselves as having their rights grounded upon a more funda-
mental basis than merely as an instrumental means to maximize overall social wealth as
measured in accordance with willingness to pay, and thus being properly defeasible if those
rights no longer contribute to that particular social goal. In other words, individual rights
are widely viewed by their holders as taking precedence over the wealth-seeking objectives
of other persons, even if overall social wealth might thereby be increased by abridgment of
those rights.
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to pay is measured by necessarily constrained offer prices rather than by
asking prices.
V. CONCLUSION
Serious policy analysis is difficult. Evaluation of any significant social
policy presents monumental challenges both in identifying and then in
quantifying all of the policy impacts upon the many persons affected into
a single bottom-line assessment, particularly when the impacts upon fu-
ture persons as well as current persons are also being taken into account.
The economic efficiency criterion provides a beguilingly simple and
straightforward framework for generating such an assessment; just add up
the willingness to pay for (or to avoid) the policy impacts upon all of the
affected persons. But as I have demonstrated, this framework of analysis
is made relatively tractable only by ignoring a large number of problems
that, taken together, drastically undercut that approach.
Some commentators have criticized Law and Economics courses as
often being biased in favor of encouraging students to uncritically apply
this evaluative criterion of economic efficiency in policy analysis, either
directly or in its cost-benefit analysis incarnation, despite these severe
conceptual and empirical shortcomings and despite the fact that the crite-
rion clearly privileges the interests of the wealthy and inadequately ad-
dresses infringements upon rights. There is considerable merit to these
criticisms, and Joe McKnight in particular would applaud the recognition
that as a historical fact, the introduction of these courses into law school
curricula in recent decades, as well as the broader incorporation of effi-
ciency analysis and cost-benefit analysis over that period into legislative,
judicial, and regulatory policymaking, has been significantly facilitated by
substantial funding provided by a small coterie of very wealthy persons
who hoped to further institutionalize the normative biases of this ap-
proach that work in their favor within the legal and political communities.
A response to these critics is called for. But I do not believe that we
need to throw out the beautiful baby of Law and Economics courses,
which surely help students understand the valuable analytical tools and
perspectives developed by economists, in order to rid ourselves of the
dirty bathwater of a poorly defined and ideologically biased evaluative
criterion. It is entirely possible for teachers of Law and Economics
courses to convey to their students not only the basic mechanics of effi-
ciency assessment and a recognition of the wide embrace of this valuation
methodology in many social contexts, but also instill an appreciation of
the numerous and substantial conceptual and empirical difficulties in-
volved in quantifying the efficiency consequences of a policy. In addition,
it is easy to call to students’ attention the rather obvious normative con-
cerns raised by the use of a one-dollar, one-vote evaluative criterion, one
that moreover does not recognize any limitations on policies based upon
infringement of rights.
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If these crippling shortcomings of efficiency assessments and cost-bene-
fit analysis are effectively communicated to students, then I believe that
the bias of many Law and Economics courses in favor of the interests of
the wealthy and against giving proper consideration to rights, a bias that
is often decried by critics, will be largely eliminated. Students who are
made aware of the significant limitations of the economic efficiency crite-
rion that I have here described will hopefully be able to more effectively
counter policy arguments that are based on dubious efficiency or cost-
benefit assessments, and they will better understand the need to disregard
or at least supplement these assessments of policies with the application
of other evaluative standards.
